In the aftermath of the financial crisis, why have reforms been incremental, despite the fact that conditions for rapid transformation appeared to be available? Is there anything specific about financial policy that prevents more radical reforms? Drawing from comparative politics and historical institutionalism in particular, as well as international political economy, this book answers these questions by examining the particular institutional frictions which characterise global financial governance, and which influence the activity of change agents and veto players involved in global regulatory change. Chapters demonstrate that the process of change in financial rule-making, as well as in the institutions governing finance, do not fit with the punctuated model of policy change. They also show, however, that incremental changes can lead to fundamental shifts in the basic principles that inform global financial governance.
List of Figures and Tables vii
Chapter One: Introduction: The Financial Crisis and the Politics of
Reform: Explaining Incremental Change
Manuela Moschella and Eleni Tsingou 1
Chapter Two: When New Ideas Meet Existing Institutions: Why
Macroprudential Regulatory Change is a Gradual Process
Andrew Baker 35
Chapter Three: Financial Services Governance in the European
Union after the Global Financial Crisis: Incremental Changes or
Lucia Quaglia 57
Chapter Four: Global in Life, Still National in Death? Special Bank
Resolution Regimes After the Crisis
Martin B. Carstensen 77
Chapter Five: Offshore Financial Centres, Shadow Banking and
Jurisdictional Competition: Incrementalism and Feeble Re-regulation
Thomas Rixen 95
Chapter Six: The Wall-Street—Main-Street Nexus in Financial
Regulation: Business Coalitions Inside and Outside the Financial
Sector in the Regulation of OTC Derivatives
Stefano Pagliari and Kevin Young 125
Chapter Seven: Continuity of Expert Rule: Global Accountancy
Regulation After the Crisis
Sebastian Botzem 149
Chapter Eight: Still in the Market for Change: The Mass Public as
a Veto-Player in US and Danish Mortgage-Systems Reform
Iver Kjar 173
Chapter Nine: Conclusions: Too Little, Too Slow?
Manuela Moschella and Eleni Tsingou 193
Manuela Moschella is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Turin. She is the author of Governing Risk: The IMF and Global Financial Crises published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2010. Her research interests include the politics of financial crises and processes of institutional change with a particular focus on the international financial institutions. She has published on these issues in a number of journals, including the Review of International Political Economy, New Political Economy, the Journal of Public Policy, Comparative European Politics and Comparative Economic Studies. She is currently co-editing the new Handbook of Global Economic Governance for Routledge.
Eleni Tsingou is Assistant Professor of International Political Economy at the Copenhagen Business School and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Warwick. She is the author of numerous chapters and articles on the governance of global finance and her work has appeared in Review of International Political Economy, International Politics and International Political Sociology. She was also a member of the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform.